Spencer Imoudu stole a car from outside a pawn shop. The owner of the car and another witness chased Imoudu. Imoudu drove the car into oncoming traffic, hit another car, and killed the driver of that car. The State charged him with felony murder and manslaughter.
When his father visited him in jail he noticed that his son was not himself. A social worker also noted Imoudu's deteriorating mental health and recommended to Imoudu's father that they dismiss court appointed counsel and hire an attorney. After meeting with Imoudu, the new attorney (along with co-counsel) filed motion for a competency evaluation because Imoudu kept staring into space and mumbling incoherently. The examining psychiatrist declared him competent and Imoudu appeared coherent, alert, and aware of the proceedings at the competency hearing. After Imoudu's performance at the hearing, the attorney conceded that Imoudu was competent to stand trial. A month later, Imoudu plead guilty to murder in exchange for a 17-year sentence.
Imoudu filed an application for writ of habeas corpus claiming his plea was involuntary based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel failed to investigate whether Imoudu was insane at the time of the offense and never informed Imoudu of the availability of an insanity defense. A psychiatrist who reviewed Imoudu's mental health history believed Imoudu had chronic mental illness and was likely insane at the time of the offense. Imoudu's medical records at the jail were extensive showing repeated referrals for mental health treatment. However, trial counsel did not request these records prior the plea and only relied upon the competency evaluation.
The Court of Criminal Appeals granted relief. Judge Meyers, writing for an eight-judge majority, explained that counsel had a duty to investigate whether Imoudu was insane at the time of the offense just based upon the same information that lead him to request a competency evaluation. He should've requested the jail medical records, but he failed to do so. This failure to investigate fell below prevailing professional norms. Moreover, Imoudu was prejudiced because it could have been validly raised and may have raised a reasonable doubt in the mind of a trier-of-fact.
[Um, doesn't he have to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence? Seems like the Court is really embracing that "diminished capacity" defense that we say we don't recognize in Texas. Of course, with an eight-judge majority, rehearing to redo the prejudice prong would seem likely to be futile. And maybe I'm overreading that anyway.]
Presiding Judge Keller dissented to state her position that the Court should've deferred to the trial court's finding that trial counsl was not ineffective. Given Imoudu's behavior at the hearing and the competency determination, the trial court's determination was supported by the record and entitled to deference. Moreover, the insanity defense would not have likely succeeded given that the psychiatrist's insanity determination was contingent upon a number of conditional assumptions.
Because this was a habeas corpus case, there was no underlying court of appeals opinion.