Case Summary - Gregory Russeau v. State

A jury found Gregory Russeau guilty of capital murder of James Syverston in 2002. Russeau beat the 75-year-old Syverston to death in his Tyler auto repair garage. The jury answered the special issues in such a way that the trial court was required to sentence him to death. In 2005, the CCA affirmed Russeau's conviction, but reversed as to punishment because the State had introduced jail records that contained narrative descriptions of Russeau's jail infractions. The jury again answered the special issues against him, and the trial court again sentenced him to death. As with other death penalty cases, Russeau raises several points of error that I'll break down into different groups. Ultimately, the CCA affirmed in an opinion authored by Judge Holcomb and joined by six of the other judges. Judge Johnson joined most of the opinion, but concurred on the issue of future dangerousness. Judge Keasler also concurred. Neither wrote an opinion.

Sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Russeau again challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, but because he was limited to the issues on remand, the CCA rejected those points of error.

Sufficiency of the evidence to establish future dangerousness. The State called 62 witnesses at punishment, including six prison guards to testify to the events contained in the jail summaries that got him the remand in the first place. [How's that Crawford objection to the jail records working out for you, now?] He called one witness. The evidence showed that Russeau committed repeated burglaries and thefts; he abused crack; he burglarized James Syverston's auto repair shop and crushed Syverston's skull with a blunt instrument; and he committed serious infractions while in jail. Two psychiatrists and one psychologist all testified that they believed Russeau would be a future danger. Looking at this evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, the CCA held that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of future dangerousness. Judge Johnson did not join the majority opinion on this issue, choosing to concur without an opinion.

Wording of the jury instructions. Russeau challenged the lack of a definition for the following words or phrases in the special issue instructions:

Probability - The Court held this term was not statutorily defined and presumed that jurors would give it it's normal meaning.
Criminal acts of violence - The Court held this is not unconstitutionally vague and need not be defined for the jury.
Militates - The Court held that this does not need a definition. Also, the Court rejected his claim that the term should've been limited to preclude consideration of prohibited factors such as race or sex because he never requested that limiting instruction.
Continuing threat to society - The Court held that the jury is presumed to understand the phrase without further instruction.

Jury instruction complaints to separate future dangerousness from mitigation. Basically, in four different points, Russeau complained that the jury should have been instructed in ways to water down the future dangerousness instruction and separate consideration of that evidence from the mitigation evidence. He complained that the jury should have only considered future dangerous evidence that might increase the defendant's moral blameworthiness. He also complained that the jury should have been instructed that a finding of guilt in the first phase of the trial did not foreclose consideration of mitigation evidence. He complained that there should have been an instruction that there's no presumption of death and the mitigation issue should be considered independently. Finally, he complained that the jury had not been given a vehicle to return a life sentence where the future dangerousness evidence was bad, but not so bad that it warranted a death sentence. The Court rejected all these arguments noting that they met the requirements of Article 37.071. [At some point there will be a case on point for every word in the punishment charge of a death penalty case.]

Grand jury consideration of facts necessary for a death sentence. The Court rejected this claim again, having done so in the previous case. This time, Russeau argued it under state law grounds, but he failed to preserve error.

Daubert hearing. The Court rejected Russeau's complaint that the trial court failed to conduct a Daubert hearing on the qualifications of the State's experts. The trial court had held that hearing during the first trial, and Russeau admitted that there was nothing new to add. More importantly, he failed to even request the hearing.

Rejected on original submission. The Court again rejected Russeau's claim that the jury should not have been instructed that at least ten jurors had to answer the first two special issues in the negative and the third issue in the positive. The Court also rejected Russeau's complaint that the jurors should have been informed that a single holdout will result in an automatic life sentence. Both issues had previously been decided against Russeau.

As mentioned above, Judge Johnson joined the majority and concurred only on the sufficiency of the future dangerousness issue. Judge Keasler concurred. Neither wrote an opinion. Because it's a death penalty case there is no underlying opinion. Here's a link to the CCA case information if you're interested.