Robert Menefee pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and entered the usual stipulations. Unfortunately, the written stipulation did not include the word "possess", so the guilty plea was only supported with a sworn statement that Menefee "did then and there with intent to deliver a controlled substance, namely cocaine, . . . " Menefee complained on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his plea in contravention of article 1.15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals upheld the plea, noting that Menefee's sworn responses during the plea colloquy provided sufficient support for his guilty plea. One judge dissented (it's at the end of the majority opinion) on the ground that the defective stipulation was only an entry of the guilty plea itself and not supportive evidence of the plea. [Here's a link to the court of appeals case info if you're interested.]
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed because Menefee's sworn plea of guilty during the plea colloquy could not serve to substantiate the guilty plea. Judge Price, writing for the six-judge majority, noted that the substantiation requirement for pleas is not required by the federal constitution, but rather from a Texas statute, article 1.15. The Court then analyzes several cases to determine whether an oral plea of guilt can substantiate the guilty plea. The cases that the court of appeals relied upon seemed to suggest so, but they failed to account for an earlier case, Drain v. State, that held otherwise. Consequently, the Court overruled those cases, Cooper v. State and Craven v. State, and held that a defendant's sworn affirmation in response to judicial questioning that he is pleading guilty does not constitute a judicial confession. The Court remanded the case for further consideration of the State's claim that the evidence at the subsequent sentencing hearing also provided support for the plea.
Judge Womack filed a concurring opinion, joined by Judge Cochran, to basically lament the ridiculousness of this requirement because it now only protects a defendant who could not be proven guilty, but will plead guilty without stipulating or judicially confessing. He also noted that the State failed to introduce real or stipulated evidence or ask Menefee to confess. Judge Cochran filed her own concurring opinion to embrace the horror. She also noted that this was trial error and it was hard to imagine how this affected Menefee's substantial rights. Presiding Judge Keller dissented, along with Judges Keasler and Hervey, to suggest that the petition should have been dismissed as improvidently granted because Menefee may not have had a right to appeal because the case was a plea bargain case. [Here's a link to the CCA case info if you're interested.]
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This case is such a bite-in-the-ass. The defendant wants to plead guilty. He reads over the paper work. Swears to his guilty plea, and reaffirms it in front of the trial court. The Constitution doesn't require anything more. The Tyler court of appeals affirms in an unpublished opinion based upon cases from the CCA that support their position. And the CCA takes discretionary review to not only reverse this case, but overrule their previous cases because they weren't developed? I know, I know, they're right about the statute, and the law is the law. It doesn't make it any less of a bite in the ass. Still, it does provide a good cautionary tale about checking plea paperwork. I wonder if you could change your plea forms to include an affirmative waiver of the substantiation requirement since it's not even constitutional. That way it never changes even though the judicial confession portion does.
Quirky appellate fact: It looks like this defendant actually testified in the trial against Gregory Russeau in 2003, the same Gregory Russeau whose opinion also came out today. Just something weird I noticed.