Case Summary - Phillip Jason Hall v. State

A police officer used LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) to detect that Phillip Hall was going eleven miles per hour over the speed limit. The officer indicated that at the beginning of his shift, he turned the device on and it initiated a self-test, which the LIDAR passed. The officer indicated he was not certified to operate the device and he was uncertain whether anyone maintained the device to ensure reliability and accuracy. The officer indicated that the LIDAR provided the sole basis for the stop. The officer stopped Hall without a warrant for speeding, and, based upon the interaction with Hall, arrested him for speeding. Hall moved to suppress the evidence, which the trial court denied.

The Waco Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the suppression motion when the State failed to prove the reliability of the LIDAR technology on which the officer based his speeding determination. The State relied upon cases upholding the use of RADAR, which was different than LIDAR. No cases were presented or found confirming the relibility or admissibility of LIDAR. Moreover, the officer did not provide any testimony that he independently observed that Hall was speeding, so the LIDAR could not be used to corroborate those observations. Presiding Justice Gray dissented without an opinion.

The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Judge Keasler, writing for an eight-judge majority, first explained that Rule 702, which governs the admissibility of scientific evidence, did not apply in pre-trial motions to suppress. However, the majority also upheld the lower court's determination that the evidence did not estabish probable cause. [Wrong standard for the stop, but probably wouldn't change the outcome of the opinion.] The State did not show that the officer relied upon "reasonable trustworthy information" to arrest because it did not offer any evidence regarding the reliability of the LIDAR technology. Neither did the trial court take judicial notice of that reliability. Finally, there was no evidence that the officer used the LIDAR device to corroborate his own independent observations and opinion that the defendant was speeding. So, while it may be necessary to determine what quantum of proof is necessary to establish the reliability of LIDAR technology for establising probable cause (something less than Kelly, but greater than zero), the Court refrained from doing so in this case. Or, as the majority said, "Our holding today is limited to the facts of this case. It is likely that in some future case, it will become necessary for a court to decide what quantum or quality of information is necessary to establish the relibiity (i.e. reasonable trustworthiness) of LIDAR technology for measuring speed when a defendant challenges the reliability of that information to defeat probable cause at a pretrial suppression hearing."

Judge Price concurred, along with Judge Johnson and Judge Holcomb. The concurrence essentially said, "What he said." Judge Price re-emphasized that the issue below was not whether the court of appeals had held a full-blown 702 hearing was required, but whether the evidence sufficiently established probable cause. The evidence regarding the LIDAR was just as compelling as relying upon a blue cube on the officer's dashboard (presumably purchased from some unlisted shop on Daigon Alley). This amounted to no showing of reliability whatsoever for the concurring judges. Presiding Judge Keller dissented without an opinion.

Here's a link to the CCA case information. Here's a link to the underlying case information. Here's a link to my post when the issue was granted.

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I think this case has some potential for mischief. It doesn't say LIDAR is unreliable, but it will probably be cited for that proposition. And practically speaking, by saying they weren't going to decide the reliability issue, they may have just required the very type of evidentiary hearing that they say is not required in pre-trial motions to suppress. At least until another case makes its way up on appeal. That said, Judge Keasler does exercise judicial restraint here. It would've been nice to have some guidance on what amounts to "reasonably trustworthy information", but that wasn't necessary to the opinion when there wasn't any information on the reliability. Maybe the case would've come out differently if the prosecution had elicited that the officer has repeatedly relied upon LIDAR to corroborate his observations or even that it did so in this case. But saying that would have been advisory.

I am, however, a little tickled that Judge Meyers didn't get upset that the State was so persuasive in getting discretionary review granted on one issue when both the majority and the concurring opinions seemed to suggest that Rule 702's applicability wasn't really crucial. Perhaps that suggests the issues are more intertwined than any of the opinions suggest. Or maybe he was just busy punishing the Hidalgo District Clerk.