Wednesday, September 30, 2009

Issue Granted - 9/30/09

On September 30, 2009, the CCA granted discretionary review in one case:

PD-0512-08, Julian Kuciemba v. State: The CCA granted the State's petition for discretionary review with oral argument in this DWI case out of Washington County on the following issue:

In order for the evidence to be legally sufficient to sustain a conviction for driving while intoxicated, is it necessary that there be presented direct evidence, instead of circumstantial evidence, of the time of the defendant's driving, thereby establishing a direct link, as opposed to a circumstantial link, to the defendant's intoxicated state at the time of driving?
Here, police were dispatched to a one-vehicle rollover accident. They found the vehicle upright in a ditch with the roof crushed. Kuciemba was behind the wheel of the truck. The deputy saw him slide across the center console into the passenger side of the vehicle and exit. Kuciemba had small lacerations on his forehead from the accident. When the officer asked what happened, Kuciemba replied that he'd fallen asleep. The deputy observed the usual signs of intoxication, and blood test later showed Kuciemba to have a blood alcohol content of .214.

The court of appeals reversed, holding the evidence was legally insufficient to establish a temporal link between Kuciemba's driving and his intoxication. The court of appeals required independent evidence of how recently the vehicle had been driven and how much time had elapsed between the the accident and the arrival of the police officer. Evidence that a suspect was drunk at the scene of an accident does not, standing alone, establish intoxication at the prohibited time. Because no one established how soon after the accident the deputy arrived, the evidence was legally insufficient, and the court of appeals ordered an acquittal.

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No. Wrong. Do over. That's my initial take upon reading the issue granted. I know, I know, this is a long-standing quirk that has arisen simply because of the way the statute is written, and if it were really that much of a problem, the legislature could've changed it. But the court of appeals does not seem to be applying a proper legal sufficiency standard here. No consideration of the lacerations on the head suggesting the defendant had been in the car during the accident? No consideration of his statement that he'd fallen asleep which implicitly acknowledges driving? And what about the condition of the car itself? It was apparently so damaged that the driver couldn't get out on the driver's side. Sure you could look at all these facts and come up with a bunch of wild hypotheticals, but that's not the proper standard of review for legal sufficiency. Proper review asks whether a rational person would look at this whole picture and necessarily harbor a reasonable doubt that the defendant drove drunk and got into an accident. Just because the court might think an alternative suggestion is plausible doesn't mean the jury acted irrationally in reaching its conclusion. Or does this case really have to be reversed because the police didn't go put their hand on the radiator?