Case Summary - Jeffery Daniel Hughen v. State

Jeffrey Hughen, and several others, were involved in a violent altercation. Hughen was arrested and taken to jail on attempted murder charges. At his Article 15.17 hearing (or magistration as everyone will soon be calling it if they aren't already), Hughen received his Miranda warnings and requested that the court appoint counsel. Three hours later, detectives pulled Hughen out of jail without waiting for counsel to be appointed. They read him his rights. Hughen indicated he understood them. Hughen agreed to waive those rights. When given a written Miranda waiver form, Hughen initialed each right that had been explained to him, but paused before signing the waiver. Hughen asked if this was waiving his right to an attorney, and the detective responded, "No sir. This is just talking with us about what happened and what was going on and all that good stuff." Hughen then gave a recorded, oral statement regarding the crime.

Hughen moved to suppress his statement claiming that it violated both his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The court of appeals ultimately affirmed the admission of the statement but only addressed Hughen's Fifth Amendment claim. The court of appeals, however, did not address the Sixth Amendment claim that Hughen had argued at the trial court and on appeal. Hughen petitioned the CCA on the ground that the court of appeals had failed to consider his Sixth Amendment claim. The CCA granted discretionary review on this ground, and later, in apparent anticipation of Montejo v. Louisiana, granted discretionary review on its own motion to consider whether the waiver to police was valid despite the request for appointed counsel.

Judge Holcomb, writing for a five-judge majority, affirmed the court of appeals decision to uphold the admission of the statement. The Court noted that Hughen did not challenge the court of appeals ruling that Hughen's Fifth Amendment waiver was valid, therefore the admission of the statement did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Then, the Court explained that Hughen's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached at magistration, but when Hughen received his Miranda warnings and agreed to waive them that was sufficient to waive Hughen's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. While Hughen tried to rely upon Michigan v. Jackson, the Court noted that that case had been overruled by Montejo v. Louisiana.

Judges Price and Johnson dissented. According to the dissenters, the court of appeals never rendered a decision on the Sixth Amendment so the Court should've remanded back to reconsider the issue. Judges Womack and Keasler concurred without an opinion.

Here's a link to the CCA case info on the attempted murder and aggravated assault cases. Here's a link to the underlying court of appeals opinion. And here's a link to my post when the CCA granted Hughen's petition for discretionary review, and my post when they granted discretionary review on their own. Finally, here's a link to the oral argument.

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Well, I certainly like the result. This gives us a little more guidance than Montejo because unlike Montejo, Hughen requested counsel at magistration and the CCA held that his valid Fifth Amendment waiver also waived his Sixth Amendment. In contrast, the Supreme Court only held that Montejo's Sixth Amendment was not presumptively invalid without deciding if the waiver was actually valid. The opinion is short and sweet and resolves the issue pretty much like you'd expect after Montejo.

The Court does not address what would happen if police approached someone they knew was represented by counsel because those facts weren't presented. However, practically speaking, checking to see if a defendant has requested court-appointed counsel no longer seems to be necessary for police under this opinion as a valid waiver of the Fifth Amendment will act to waive the Sixth Amendment as well. Also, the Court brushed aside the officer's deflection of Hughen's question about not giving up his attorney before waiving his rights. Perhaps stronger language from a defendant will invalidate the waiver, but that analysis seems like it would naturally parallel the already established invocation case law. I guess this means that Hughen's mention of counsel was ambiguous and equivocal.

Judge Price does have a point, however, about the majority addressing an issue that the court of appeals had not ruled on and how that's a bad thing. Nice pivot, though. I mean, Hughen himself sought review of this issue when he thought Rothgery would help him win on Sixth Amendment grounds. Then Montejo came out and the defendant's claim should be sent back for reconsideration by the court of appeals. I, for one, am glad that they considered the issue so we get the CCA's take so soon after Montejo, but just because I like the result doesn't change the fact that procedurally, they should've sent it back for the court of appeals to consider the Sixth Amendment claim in light of Montejo. Probably would've resulted in the same outcome anyway, just from a lower court. I'm sure I could go back and find examples of how either Judge Price or Judge Johnson are being hypocritical by criticizing the majority for reaching an issue to get to a result despite procedural problems, but I'm sure every member of the Court has had that moment at some point so why bother. Judge Price and Judge Johnson showed some judicial restraint, and they deserve credit. So, gold star for them, for whatever a gold star from me is worth.