Wednesday, October 21, 2009

Oral Arguments - 10/21/09

On September 21, 2009, the CCA heard oral arguments in the following cases:

AP-75,750, Adam Kelly Ward v. State, a capital murder case out of Hunt County:
Appellant's opening - Roland Ferguson
State's response - Stephen R. Tittle, Jr.
Appellant's rebuttal
This case was a death penalty appeal, so there is no underlying opinions to which I can link.

PD-0401-09, Ex parte Amber Lovill, a forgery case out of Nueces County:
State's opening - Douglas K. Norman
Appellant's response - Brian C. Miller
State's rebuttal
Here's a link to the underlying opinion. Here's a link to the court of appeal case info. And here's a link to my post when the issue was granted.

PD-1805-08, Joseph Denver Smith v. State, an indecent exposure case out Harris County:
Appellant's opening - Melissa Martin
State's response - Alan Curry
Appellant's rebuttal.
Here's a link to the underlying opinion and a link to the underlying case info. Here's a link tomy post when the issue was granted.

PD-0493-09, Douglas Michael Hubert v. State, a possession of a firearm by a felon case out of Nueces County:

State Prosecuting Attorney's opening - Lisa "Acid and Adrenaline" McMinn
Appellant's response - Bianca Medina
State Prosecuting Attorney's rebuttal.
Here's a link to the first underlying opinion which was subsequently withdrawn (so get it while it's hot). Here's a a link to the new and improved underlying opinion. Here's a link to the court of appeals case info.

Thursday, October 15, 2009

New Oral Argument Posts

By way of a placeholder, I've now posted audio for oral arguments that took place on the following days:

September 11, 2009

September 16, 2009

September 30, 2009

October 7, 2009

The oral argument link list on the right of the home page has also been updated.

No Issues Granted - 10/14/09

On October 14, 2009, the CCA dd not grant discretionary review on any new issues. And this hand down list proves it.

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

Today's Opinions - 10/14/09

The CCA handed down a number of orders today, but no published opinions.

So, by way of a palate cleanser, I offer you this from mc chris (language advisory):

Wednesday, October 7, 2009

Oral Arguments - 10/7/09

On October 7, 2009, the CCA heard oral argument in the following cases:

AP-75,749, Dexter Darnell Johnson v. State, a capital murder case out of Harris County:

Appellant's opening - Charles Hinton
State's response - Jessica Caird
Appellant's rebuttal
This was a death penalty case, so appeal to the CCA was automatic and there was no underlying court of appeals opinion (or post from me about granting of discretionary review). Sorry.

AP-75,634, Adrian Estrada v. State, a capital murder case out of Bexar County:

Appellant's opening - Brian W. Stull
State's response - Crystal Chandler
Appellant's rebuttal
Againwith the death penalty and no underlying opinion or post about the CCA granting discretionary review. C'est la vie.

PD-1263-08, Rodger Eugene Mansfield, Jr. v. State, an aggravated sexual assault out of Harris County:

Apellant's opening - Janet, not Robert, Morrow
State's response - Carol Cameron
Appellant's response
Here's a link to the underlying opinion. Here's a link to the underlying case information. And here's a link to my post when the CCA granted discretionary review.

PD-1569-08, Francis William Stringer v. State, a possession of child pornography case out of Tarrant County:

Appellant's opening - David A. Pearson, IV
State's response - Debra Windsor
Appellant's rebuttal
Here's a link to the court of appeals opinion. Here's a link to the court of appeals case information. And here's a link to my post when the CCA granted discretionary review.

Issues Granted - 10/7/09

There were no new issues granted this week. No, really. It says so right here. Well, it said so, until they updated the list with new issues. Curse you working Court.

Today's Opinions - 10/7/09

Today, the CCA handed down orders including two published opinions in the following cases:

AP-76,034, Ex parte Bobby Wayne Woods: The Court dismissed Woods' subsequent writ of habeas corpus because a rational trier of fact could still find that Woods was not mentally retarded based upon the prior evidence he presented in a previous claim and the new evidence he presented in his subsequent writ. Click here for a link to a summary of this lengthy opinion.

PD-1123-08 & PD-1124-08, Jeffery Daniel Hughen v. State: The Court held that Hughen's custodial statement was admissible based upon his valid waiver of his right to counsel even though he had requested court appointed counsel at magistration. Click here for a link to a summary of the opinion.

Case Summary - Ex parte Bobby Wayne Woods

Bobby Wayne Woods abducted a nine-year-old boy and his eleven-year-old sister from their home in the middle of the night. First, he engaged in sexual activity with the girl, then he abducted the kids. He drove the kids to a remotely located cemetary where he severely beat and choked the boy, leaving him for dead. Then, he drove the girl to another location where he cut her throat almost all the way around. She died.

At his death penalty trial, Woods put on evidence that he was mentally retarded as a mitigating circumstance even though this was pre-Atkins. The testifying defense expert opined that Woods was mentally retarded based upon a report prepared by a non-testifying defense expert who came to the conclusion that Woods, of borderline intelligence, was not mentally retarded because of his adaptive skills. Woods was sentenced to death.

After the Supreme Court decided Atkins, the CCA remanded the case back on a subsequent writ of habeas corpus for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of mental retardation. Schmitt, the defense expert appointed for this hearing assessed Woods as mentally retarded. The IQ score came in at 68 after Schmitt adjusted the test for the Flynn effect, but the potential deviation of five points either way gave Woods an IQ range of 63 to 73. However, the adaptive functioning test (based on information from his grandmother) showed that Woods was functioning at or near his age level of 38 in every category and scale except a scale measuring money and value. Schmitt also testified that Woods had deficits in functional academic skills and work, sufficient for Woods to be classified as mentally retarded. He also criticized the previous, non-testifying expert's approach to examining Woods because he used a "half-full" approach instead of a "half-empty" approach. In other words, Schmitt believed that Atkins requires to a psychologist to look at a defendant's deficits rather than his attributes. Schmitt admitted on cross examination that someone could look at these same tests and come to the conclusion that Woods was not mentally retarded.

And, lest we forget, Woods worked as a short-order cook and had held several jobs in food prepartion including one at Waffle House. It's not quite the fast-food lynchpin of mental retardation, but it is in the food service industry. Schmitt testified that this was in keeping with someone who was mildly retarded, but on cross-examination he admitted this job took some level of skill and organization and thinking.

The prison psychologist testified that Woods' full scale IQ was 83. He noted that Woods didn't have a history of mental health treatment and it would be unusual for someone to pop up at age 32 as mentally retarded. The State's expert from the trial testified that he thought Woods functioned well as a short-order cook and that he disagreed with Schmitt's opinion that Woods was deficient in work and functional academic skills.

The trial court rejected Woods' Atkins claim. Then, the feds rejected Woods' Atkins claim after he litigated it there. Two days before his scheduled execution (and about 30 pages into a 44 page opinion) Woods filed a subsequent writ presenting the same Atkins claim, but with additional evidence. Not "new" evidence, just additional evidence that required Woods to show by clear and convincing evidence that no rational juror would ahve answered in the state' favor one or more of the special issues that were submitted to the jury in Woods' trial. Under Ex parte Blue, the additional evidence had to demonstrate, clearly and convincingly, that no rational finder of fact would fail to find Woods was mentally retarded." The new evidence? Another psychologist's opinion based upon unconsidered affidavits from family members, childhood friends, and co-workers an a previously unconsidered IQ test. [Of course, the affidavit notes that even mentally retarded people can be short-order cooks.]

Judge Hervey, writing for the majority held that the additional evidence did not compellingly or dramatically undermine the substantial evidence that supported a finding that Woods was not mentally retarded. Even applying the Flynn effect, a rational fact finder could find the high, non-retarded edge of Woods' IQ score more compelling. Additionally, Woods testified skillfully in his defense at his trial that his cousin (who had died before trial) committed the capital murder. Woods admitted in his trial that he couldn't read some words, but denied claiming that he could not read. While the new expert viewed the fact that Woods had checked out 115 books from the prison library a "cloak of competence", a rational factfinder could have believed he actually read those books. Consequently, the Court dismissed Woods' subsequent writ.

Presiding Judge Keller concurred, as she did in Ex parte Blue, that Blue was a bad idea to begin with and this lengthy opinion was a prime example of the time and effort that results in addressing such meritless claims out of reliance upon Blue. Blue had held that someone could raise a mental retardation claim in a subsequent writ even though they had the opportunity to do so post-Atkins and chose not to. According to the concurrence, this opinion takes the next step in allowing reconsideration of a meritless claim that had already been litigated just because the defendant finds another relative or another expert who is willing to suggest that the applicant has some form of mental deficiency.

[And really Presiding Judge Keller's opinion gives a quick understanding of what this case was about and why it was probably ultimately published. The issue was whether a defendant who fully litigated his mental retardation claim could re-litigate the same claim in a subsequent writ by getting another expert opinion that basically said the same thing that the previous expert had said. Of course, Judge Hervey's diligence (and patience) in going through the claim with in fine detail deserves some credit for transparency. These moments rarely get acknowledged, so, I'm acknowledging it. That said, I totally feel Presiding Judge Keller's lament that this was exhausting to go through for an ultimately meritless claim.]

Here's a link to the CCA case info, and here's a link to the oral argument. However, there's no underlying opinion I can link you to because it's a death penalty case.

Case Summary - Jeffery Daniel Hughen v. State

Jeffrey Hughen, and several others, were involved in a violent altercation. Hughen was arrested and taken to jail on attempted murder charges. At his Article 15.17 hearing (or magistration as everyone will soon be calling it if they aren't already), Hughen received his Miranda warnings and requested that the court appoint counsel. Three hours later, detectives pulled Hughen out of jail without waiting for counsel to be appointed. They read him his rights. Hughen indicated he understood them. Hughen agreed to waive those rights. When given a written Miranda waiver form, Hughen initialed each right that had been explained to him, but paused before signing the waiver. Hughen asked if this was waiving his right to an attorney, and the detective responded, "No sir. This is just talking with us about what happened and what was going on and all that good stuff." Hughen then gave a recorded, oral statement regarding the crime.

Hughen moved to suppress his statement claiming that it violated both his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The court of appeals ultimately affirmed the admission of the statement but only addressed Hughen's Fifth Amendment claim. The court of appeals, however, did not address the Sixth Amendment claim that Hughen had argued at the trial court and on appeal. Hughen petitioned the CCA on the ground that the court of appeals had failed to consider his Sixth Amendment claim. The CCA granted discretionary review on this ground, and later, in apparent anticipation of Montejo v. Louisiana, granted discretionary review on its own motion to consider whether the waiver to police was valid despite the request for appointed counsel.

Judge Holcomb, writing for a five-judge majority, affirmed the court of appeals decision to uphold the admission of the statement. The Court noted that Hughen did not challenge the court of appeals ruling that Hughen's Fifth Amendment waiver was valid, therefore the admission of the statement did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Then, the Court explained that Hughen's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached at magistration, but when Hughen received his Miranda warnings and agreed to waive them that was sufficient to waive Hughen's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. While Hughen tried to rely upon Michigan v. Jackson, the Court noted that that case had been overruled by Montejo v. Louisiana.

Judges Price and Johnson dissented. According to the dissenters, the court of appeals never rendered a decision on the Sixth Amendment so the Court should've remanded back to reconsider the issue. Judges Womack and Keasler concurred without an opinion.

Here's a link to the CCA case info on the attempted murder and aggravated assault cases. Here's a link to the underlying court of appeals opinion. And here's a link to my post when the CCA granted Hughen's petition for discretionary review, and my post when they granted discretionary review on their own. Finally, here's a link to the oral argument.

* * * * *

Well, I certainly like the result. This gives us a little more guidance than Montejo because unlike Montejo, Hughen requested counsel at magistration and the CCA held that his valid Fifth Amendment waiver also waived his Sixth Amendment. In contrast, the Supreme Court only held that Montejo's Sixth Amendment was not presumptively invalid without deciding if the waiver was actually valid. The opinion is short and sweet and resolves the issue pretty much like you'd expect after Montejo.

The Court does not address what would happen if police approached someone they knew was represented by counsel because those facts weren't presented. However, practically speaking, checking to see if a defendant has requested court-appointed counsel no longer seems to be necessary for police under this opinion as a valid waiver of the Fifth Amendment will act to waive the Sixth Amendment as well. Also, the Court brushed aside the officer's deflection of Hughen's question about not giving up his attorney before waiving his rights. Perhaps stronger language from a defendant will invalidate the waiver, but that analysis seems like it would naturally parallel the already established invocation case law. I guess this means that Hughen's mention of counsel was ambiguous and equivocal.

Judge Price does have a point, however, about the majority addressing an issue that the court of appeals had not ruled on and how that's a bad thing. Nice pivot, though. I mean, Hughen himself sought review of this issue when he thought Rothgery would help him win on Sixth Amendment grounds. Then Montejo came out and the defendant's claim should be sent back for reconsideration by the court of appeals. I, for one, am glad that they considered the issue so we get the CCA's take so soon after Montejo, but just because I like the result doesn't change the fact that procedurally, they should've sent it back for the court of appeals to consider the Sixth Amendment claim in light of Montejo. Probably would've resulted in the same outcome anyway, just from a lower court. I'm sure I could go back and find examples of how either Judge Price or Judge Johnson are being hypocritical by criticizing the majority for reaching an issue to get to a result despite procedural problems, but I'm sure every member of the Court has had that moment at some point so why bother. Judge Price and Judge Johnson showed some judicial restraint, and they deserve credit. So, gold star for them, for whatever a gold star from me is worth.