Opinion Summary - Ex parte Oscar Roy Doster

The State indicted Oscar Roy Doster for capital murder in Freestone County, Texas on May 30, 2007. At the time of the indictment, Doster was in an Alabama prison (no Midnight Special for him). His presence was obtained in Texas by a Governor's Warrant on January 28, 2008. At the arraignment, the trial court suggested a date of May 5, 2008. The prosecutor had a conflict and suggested June 2nd, and defense counsel responded that he did not think he would be ready to go to trial by June 2nd with all the investigation that he needed to do.

The trial court suggested August 4th, but defense counsel indicated there might be a conflict on that day as well. However, at a pre-trial hearing on March 25th, Doster's counsel requested that the trial occur within the time limit established by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (120 days from Doster's arrival in Texas) which would be in April. The prosecution filed a motion that the extension to August 4th was a necessary and reasonable continuance. The trial court made a finding that the August 4th setting was an agreed setting.

On July 8th, Doster filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus to dismiss the case for failing to comply with IAD time limits. The trial court denied the writ, and Doster filed an interlocutory appeal. Initially the court of appeals reversed. Chief Justice Gray dissented arguing that the IAD did not apply because Doster was extradited under the UCEA (remember the Governor's warrant . . . it seems like so long ago), but even if the IAD did apply, Doster waived the claim by agreeing to the August 4th date. The court of appeals granted the State's motion for rehearing, withdrew its original opinion, and affirmed the denial of relief holding that Doster had been extradited under the UCEA not the IAD.

Wshew! [Here's a link to the court of appeals case info, if you're interested.]

A unanimous CCA vacated the court of appeals opinion and ordered that the appeal be dismissed. Presiding Judge Keller, writing for the majority, explained that the rationale for allowing cognizability of a limitations claim does not extend to challenges under the IAD. Statute of limitations claims that are apparent on the face of the indictment make clear that it would be a waste to wait until the trial is over to consider a slam dunk issue that will result in a reversal.

However, speedy trial claims are not allowed to be raised in an interlocutory appeal because that would threaten precisely the values manifested in the Speedy Trial Clause. In other words, if the defendant truly wants a speedy trial, delaying the case to consider the appeal of a denial of a motion for speedy trial is well . . . ironic (and not in the Alanis Morrisette kind of way). And a defendant might be willing to delay a proceeding attendant upon the hope of winning an appeal of a denial of a speedy trial motion, so delay-causing prejudice would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, interests of judicial economy are only advanced if the defendant prevails. If he loses, then more judicial resources would be used had the interlocutory appeal been barred. In the context of an IAD claim, a defendant would end up spending more time in Texas contrary to the purpose of the IAD. And given the allocation of burdens on appeal, when the defendant loses at the trial level he's also more likely to lose on appeal.

The Court also noted that this case provided a good example of how the interlocutory appeal frustrated the prompt resolution of Doster's charges. Doster could have been tried on August 4, 2008. This opinion came out February 3 . . . 2010. And bouncing this case back and forth in "appellate orbit" between the appellate court and the CCA would further frustrate the purpose of the IAD.

Of course, the State could appeal the dismissal of an indictment pursuant to the IAD because that would effectively end the prosecution so the appeal would not be interlocutory. And, if the facts are undisputed and the trial court still doesn't dismiss, mandamus may be appropriate for the defendant. But Doster's interlocutory appeal of the denial of his pre-trial writ was not appropriate, so the CCA vacated the court of appeals and ordered the appeal dismissed.